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Combinatorial auctions are auctions that sell multiple items simultaneously
and allow bidders to bid on packages (sometimes called combinations or bundles)
of items. We refer to de Vries and Vohra (2003), Abrache et al. (2007), and
Cramton et al. (2006) for a survey of general combinatorial auction literature.
Allowing bidders to create custom packages potentially increases economic eﬃ-
ciency and seller revenues. Indeed, when package bids are allowed, the exposure
problem is avoided. However, economic eﬃciency is still hampered by the pres-
ence of the so-called threshold problem. The phenomenon that multiple small
bidders (i.e. bidders on sets of items with small cardinality) appear not capable of
jointly outbidding a large bidder, although the valuation of the bidders would
allow the small bidders to do so. This eﬀect is partly attributed to the fact that
the small bidders are unaware of each other's presence, and therefore experience
no incentive to keep bidding in an ascending combinatorial auction.
We study bidding behavior in ascending combinatorial auctions with thresh-
old problems, using diﬀerent levels of feedback. We do this in an experimental
setting using human bidders. We vary feedback from very basic information
about provisionally winning bids and their prices, to more advanced concepts as
winning and deadness levels (see e.g. Adomavicius and Gupta (2005) and Ado-
mavicius et al. (2012)), and even so-called coalitional feedback, aimed at helping
bidders to overcome potential threshold problems. Hence, the main question
we address is the following: Does additional feedback help bidders overcome
threshold problems in ascending combinatorial auctions? We test this in diﬀer-
ent auction environments, varying the number of items and bidders as well as the
severity of the threshold problem. To relate decision making in our experimental
setting to individual diﬀerences, we create a personality proﬁle for each bidder
using the Big-Five Trait Taxonomy.
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